On 30 April, Beijing hosted an event that deserves far more careful attention than it received in Western news coverage. The Chinese government held the founding assembly of the World Data Organization (WDO) — the first international organisation in history dedicated specifically to data governance and development. With 200 members from more than 40 countries, bringing together companies, universities, think tanks, and financial institutions across 14 sectors ranging from manufacturing to healthcare, the new entity may appear small on paper, but it is potentially very important in practice. It fills an institutional gap that no other multilateral organisation has addressed until now, and it does so at a moment when the struggle for control over data has become central to geopolitics in the global digital agenda. Unlike institutions based on multilateral treaties, the WDO will not establish binding rules — it will focus on policy coordination, standard-setting recommendations, and capacity building. Organisations without coercive power may seem merely decorative at first glance. But this is how ISO was born, and how IEEE operates: entities that consensually define standards that shape what can and cannot be done at an industrial scale. Those who control the standards-setting and protocols largely control the markets they structure. Xi Jinping sent a message to the WDO stating that the world is accelerating toward the intelligent era, and that the role of data as a fundamental resource and driver of innovation is becoming increasingly evident. This action is as telling as the content. The WDO does not emerge out of nowhere; it is the culmination of a methodical trajectory China has adopted over nearly a decade. In 2017, Xi described data as “a new factor of production.” In 2020, the Communist Party of China formally recognised data as the fifth factor of production, alongside land, labour, capital, and technology. As described here, in 2023, China created the National Data Administration and became the only country to adopt national accounting standards for data assets, allowing companies to include their informational assets on balance sheets. The WDO is therefore not an entirely new initiative, but the international projection of an architecture that already exists and functions domestically. Muhammadou M.O. Kah, president of the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development, spoke at the inaugural assembly — signalling that the UN recognises the WDO as a relevant channel for global rule-making. This move must be understood in its strategic context: in recent years, Washington has intensified the use of the CHIPS Act and semiconductor export controls to contain Beijing. China’s response has not been symmetrical — it has been institutional, creating multilateral forums in which the United States cannot exercise the veto power it holds in institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF. For developing countries, the issue is not abstract. It is about whether data produced by Brazilian farmers, Indian patients, or African consumers will be processed and monetised in Silicon Valley or Seattle, or whether conditions will exist for the value generated from data to benefit more equitably the countries where it originates. Raw data — medical, agricultural, financial, climatic — is now the raw material for AI language models, fraud detection systems, and image-based diagnostics. Economies that do not control their strategic data deepen dependencies that tend to become irreversible. The WDO promises to “bridge the data gap” and create mechanisms for more countries to benefit from digitalization. These promises cater to a real demand. The responses of major actors differ sharply. For Washington, the WDO is a problem because existing U.S. pressure tools — sanctions and export controls — have little traction over a voluntary standards body. For Brussels, it is a paradox: the EU has produced the GDPR, the Data Act, and the AI Act, but does not control the adoption of its standards beyond its borders. India occupies the most complex position, having built its own digital infrastructure — UPI, India Stack, and the 2023 Data Protection Law — and having asserted at the 2023 G20 autonomous views on data flows that align neither with Washington nor Beijing. New Delhi will likely pursue selective engagement with the WDO: present enough to influence standards that will affect its economy, but cautious not to be seen as endorsing Chinese leadership in global data architecture. Within BRICS, under Brazil’s presidency in 2025, member countries approved the “Understanding on Data Economy Governance,” establishing shared principles for a fair, secure, and sovereign data economy, with emphasis on interoperability, portability, and respect for national frameworks. This signals that the Global South is beginning to formulate its own positions to avoid being shaped by the technical choices of other states. The creation of the WDO does not resolve the core deadlocks of global governance — WTO negotiations remain stalled, and the debate over the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions is still open. What the WDO does is to introduce a new actor with sufficient critical mass to shape agendas and build coalitions — especially among countries that have so far been more objects than subjects of data governance. By invoking the right to regulatory self-determination, China appeals to countries that distrust both European universalism and the market power of major U.S. platforms. It is an effective rhetoric, connected to a real demand. What it does not resolve is the asymmetry between formal openness and real influence: an organisation headquartered in Beijing and structured from a Chinese initiative will tend to reflect Chinese priorities in its technical choices — even if its statutes provide for equal voting. For developing countries, the window of opportunity to influence the direction of the WDO is open now, and should be taken advantage of before its internal architecture solidifies, its technical standards consolidate, and the ability to shape it diminishes drastically. Data governance is a question of power: who decides which data circulates, under what conditions, with what trade-offs, and who captures the value generated. For decades, these decisions were made without effective participation from developing countries — in the corridors of Brussels, in data centres in Virginia, or in technical committees in Geneva, where few had an active voice. The WDO does not answer these questions on its own — it is the arena in which these answers will be formulated and contested. The Global South has data, has demand, and now has a space for debate and cooperation. It remains to be seen what countries will do with this opportunity.Institutional architecture
What is at stake for the Global South
What comes next
About the author
James Görgen has been a Public Policy and Government Management Specialist since 2008. He holds a Master’s degree in Communication and Information from UFRGS. He is currently an advisor at the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services of Brazil and a member of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee.
